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DON'T EVER DISCUSS RUST v. SULLIVAN 
WITH A LADY IN A GROCERY LINE 
John B. Mitchell* 
I was standing near the end of one of those very long grocery 
lines, where everyone ahead of you has a full cart and an out-of-
state check, when the lady in front of me pointed to the newspaper 
and asked, "Have you seen this?" Looking closely, I saw that she 
was referring to an article announcing the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Rust v. Sullivan.t In fact, I had read the article that 
morning and had even been prompted to read the slip opinion. The 
article had contained a fairly good summary of the essential aspects 
of the case. Congress had previously passed legislation, in part 
funding family planning clinics. The legislation had specifically 
stated that none of these funds were to be used in a program where 
abortion was employed as a method of family planning. Recently, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Resources had passed a series 
of regulations interpreting this legislation. These regulations were 
the subject of the case, and were held to be constitutional by a ma-
jority of justices. Specifically, the regulations prohibited family-
planning clinics receiving funds under the legislation from engaging 
in counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities advocating 
abortion as a method of family planning. The regulations required 
such projects to maintain an objective integrity and independence 
from the prohibited abortion activities by the use of separate facili-
ties, personnel, and accounting records.2 Further, under the regula-
tions, the programs were expressly forbidden to refer a client to an 
abortion provider even upon specific request. One permissible re-
sponse to such an inquiry was that "the project does not consider 
abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore 
does not counsel or refer for abortion."J 
I was, however, not about to discuss this delicate topic with a 
• Visiting Professor in Constitutional Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; 
J.D., Stanford, 1970. I wish to thank Annette Clark, David Skover, and Pierre Schlag for 
their helpful comments and insights. 
I. IllS. Ct. 1759 (1991) (considering the constitutionality of regulations interpreting 
§ 1008 of Title X of the Public Health Service Act). 
2. ld. at 1765. 
3. Id., quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(bX5). 
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stranger, and was preparing to end the conversation when I realized 
that I knew this woman. Her children had graduated from the 
same high school as mine. So I acknowledged that I had scanned 
the article over morning coffee. 
But don't you think the case was wrong, Mr. Mitchell? 
I gave some non-committal response, which I thought would 
end the matter. Instead, the dialogue which follows ensued. As I 
recall, the discussion began with what then seemed like a naive 
claim to the first amendment: 
But, doesn't that violate free speech, Mr. Mitchell? 
No, I don't think so. Free speech isn't really the point. The 
point is that government should be able to pay just for what it wants 
and not have to pay for what it doesn't want. Look, if you buy a 
carpet, you can insist on receiving a blue carpet. No one can make 
you take a yellow one when you're the one paying. You're not tell-
ing the store that it can't sell yellow carpet to other people; it's just 
not what you're paying for. Same here. The government only 
wants to pay for family planning services that do not involve abor-
tion. If someone else wants to support such services, fine. But the 
government does not want to pay for a "yellow carpet," and there is 
no reason they should have to. So, what do you hear about the high 
school? 
But, Mr. Mitchell, the government gives money to our school. 
Does that mean that they can tell us that we can only have the money 
if our children don't study Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair, 
because they don't want to pay for anything that makes them look 
bad? 
Good question, but the Court dealt with that in this case. The 
Justices said, and I quote, that "the university is a traditional sphere 
of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society 
that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere 
by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government 
funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of 
the First Amendment."4 
4. Id. at 1776. See, for example, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). I 
did not mention that the Court also indicated that the government could not restrict speech 
on traditional public forums just because it subsidizes them. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1776. 
I did not think the point added anything to the conversation and, to tell the truth, there are 
hints that the Court may let the government be rather stingy with the public forum concept, 
leaving the government to define as not public everything but public parks and some side-
walks. See, generally, United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (sidewalk leading to 
post office not a public forum). Compare also Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675 (1986) (school a restrictive forum for speech); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726, 728 (1978) (radio broadcasts a restrictive forum for speech). 
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But, Mr. Mitchell, what if we're talking about high school, and 
not university? Would the Court think that high school is traditional, 
fundamental, and such, or just there to keep teens from getting into 
trouble and to indoctrinate them into whatever the current govern-
ment thinks makes a good citizen? And even if federal funds to our 
school can't be conditioned on what subjects may and may not be 
taught, education takes place in a lot more places than formal public 
schools: museum tours, training programs in the workplace, even 
factory bulletin boards. Are you saying that if the museum gets gov-
ernment funds or the factory or business gets government contracts, 
that the government can require the tour guide to extol the virtues of 
the current government, the factory to post pro-government posters on 
the bulletin board, and all training programs to contain a unit cre-
ated by the government in praise of the government? 
Well, the government generally can't tell us what to say.s 
But, Mr. Mitchell, according to this article, the family planning 
doctors have to say that "the project does not consider abortion an 
appropriate method of family planning. " 
That's only one permissive response to a request for abortion 
referral. It is not mandatory. The doctors just can't give abortion 
advice, because that's not what Congress is paying for. And the 
government has a right to get what it's paying for, and to not pay 
for what it doesn't want. 
Ok. Even if the tour guide or the factory do not have to praise 
the government, can the government grant or contract require that 
they not criticize the government? 
I think that depends. If the restriction is related to the basic 
objectives of the government funding so that it is part of the govern-
ment getting what it is paying for, I'd say yes; otherwise, no. Let 
me give some examples. If the museum grant is to fund a traveling 
exhibit of art inspired by the recent war with Iraq, and the whole 
point of funding the exhibit is to reinforce a mood of unquestioning 
patriotism, then I think the museum guide could be restricted dur-
ing the tour from criticizing the government's participation in the 
war. The government is paying for propaganda, and propaganda it 
should get. If, instead, the grant was just a general one to support 
the arts, I think the guides should be able to say anything they wish. 
5. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (citizen cannot be made to dis-
play license plate bearing motto "Live Free or Die"); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (voiding statute giving "right of reply" to candidates not fa-
vored in newspapers' articles); Communist Pany of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974) 
(voiding state statute requiring loyalty oath as condition of access to state ballot); West Vir-
ginia SL Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school child cannot be forced to join in 
flag salute ceremony). 
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Same with the factory. A defense contract in time of war-where 
confidence in the quality of materials being sent to the troops is 
important-may well merit conditions restraining criticism of the 
government that a contract with a peacetime supplier of concrete 
for sidewalks in Washington, D.C., does not. The conditions re-
stricting counseling of abortion in family-planning clinics is, of 
course, directly related to what the government has decided to pay 
for-a clinic offering methods of birth control, with the specific ex-
clusion of abortion. 
Could you condition the public entrance to this Celebration of 
War exhibit on not making any comments criticizing the war, and 
toss out any people who do? 
It's possible. I'm not saying I think it would be wise, but I can 
think of an argument how that might be legal. The government is 
underwriting the cost of the opportunity to view the exhibit, and is 
not paying to have its expenditure undermined by anti-war protests. 
That's the antithesis of what they're paying for. Barring public crit-
icism of the war in this situation would therefore be clearly related 
to the expenditure. 
Excuse me, but I find what you're saying pretty scary, Mr. 
Mitchell. Federal money is everywhere-in fact, by taking a large 
portion of our income through taxes, the federal government in effect 
controls much of what we might otherwise have left over for private 
donations--<.md this "related to" notion sounds like something that 
smart people and lawyers could easily manipulate. So, let me get 
clear what you're saying. Are you saying that the National Endow-
ment for the Arts could condition a grant on the work not being "dis-
tasteful, " etc.? 
I would certainly think so. Artists are free to create, but the 
government does not have to subsidize their private, idiosyncratic 
visions. 
Can the grant be conditioned on the artist agreeing not to protest 
publicly against the censorship of art which the government finds dis-
tasteful? After all, that's related to the cu"ent government's goal of 
not sponsoring distasteful art. 
Frankly, I do not see how. No matter what he or she says, the 
government still isn't paying for art it does not want, while in the 
family-planning situation, if the doctor speaks to the patient about 
abortion, the government is paying for what it doesn't want. 
I'm just applying your notion that the restriction on speech must 
be related to the goal of the expenditure. Maybe I should explain. 
I'm assuming that Congress would have one or both of two reasons 
not to pay for "distasteful" art. One, the majority of members of 
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Congress themselves don't like it. Two, a significant (or, at least vo-
cal, organized, and/or wealthy) group of people they represent-not 
at all necessarily a majority-would be offended, and their represent-
atives do not feel that these constituents should have to pay their own 
tax dollars to be offended. In either case, an articulate artist speak-
ing out against the restrictions, a.k.a. censorship, of his or her work 
by the federal government might gain majority public support to pres-
sure Congress to lift the restriction and thereby jeopardize the inter-
ests which led to not paying for distasteful art to begin with. That's 
how banning the artists from speaking out against censorship is 
"related. " 
Very good. Well, for sake of argument, I'll grant that the con-
dition on your artist's speech is "related," though I don't think 
Congress would ever go that far. But that does not lead to the 
wholesale suppression of speech that you seem to think I endorse. 
On his or her own time, the artist can say or do anything he or she 
wants. The same is true of doctors at the family-planning clinics. 
It's just while they're on the government's time that the government 
has the right to say what it is and isn't paying for. 
Fine. We'll assume at this point that we are able to segment the 
doctor's time between time spent physically at the clinic and time 
spent away-further assuming that this group of doctors does not get 
patient calls at night, weekends and such-but when is an artist who 
is working on a book or sculpture working on the government's time 
and when is it just his or her life? 
Interesting question. Are you glad you don't have to attend 
anymore music concerts now that your kids are out of high school? 
Mr. Mitchell, if the government is entitled to pay for what it 
wants and not pay for what it doesn't want, can it pay us to give up 
our rights? For example, could it pay a woman a hundred dollars 
not to have an abortion and to have her child instead? 
I don't see why not. It's her choice. Surely, the government 
can encourage certain choices, and not remain neutral on every sub-
ject. For example, the government is pro-literacy and anti-drugs. 
Again, it would still be the woman's choice. And that's really the 
essence of her right-which is not so much a matter of having or 
not having an abortion, but the right to be free to choose. So, in 
your example, you're not really paying the woman to give up her 
right, but trying to influence how it's exercised. 
Could the government pay the woman a million dollars not to 
have an abortion? 
That may be problematic. It would likely be viewed as so coer-
cive as to not make the woman's choice a voluntary one. 
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But one hundred dollars is different? 
I would think so, because of what I've already said. 
Could Congress pass a resolution endorsing the Democratic can-
didate in a presidential election, just to try to "influence" how people 
will exercise their right to vote? Or, how about paying voters in a 
particular district five dollars not to vote? Five dollars certainly isn't 
enough to be coercive, is it? 
The answer to both of your suggestions is no. Congress could 
lawfully do neither thing. Let me elaborate. Both interfere with the 
vote, the foundational right of our entire democracy. Abortion 
hardly holds this status. Further, neither of your examples is likely 
based on a legitimate governmental end. In contrast, encouraging 
various forms of birth control, but not abortion, is surely a legiti-
mate goal of government. Finally, unlike your five dollar example, 
the government in the family-planning case is not paying anyone to 
give up their rights; Congress is paying for a program in which it 
only desires to pay for pre-pregnancy birth control. In your exam-
ple, the whole purpose of the money was to make people give up 
their right to vote. 
I don't understand the difference, Mr. Mitchell It seems to me 
that the government is paying for the doctors not to speak freely or 
talk about abortion. I mean, the doctors are free to talk about any-
thing else with the patients: kids, vacation plans, favorite sports 
teams--anything, except abortion. 
See, I think you've missed the point again. The government is 
not paying for silence, it's paying for a particular program. If the 
clinic does not like the conditions, it doesn't have to accept the 
money. 
I don't see it that way. What I see is the federal government 
looking at all the clinics that would otherwise be eligible for funding 
and saying we'll give money to you only if you give up what would 
otherwise be your first amendment right to discuss abortion with your 
patients. 
The doctors can speak all they want. They can do all the abor-
tion counseling they desire. They can even lobby Congress en 
masse. But the government is not compelled to subsidize these ac-
tivities through funding. 6 
This is not a question of whether the government must subsidize 
the doctor's free speech. Instead, the doctors are, in effect, being paid 
not to speak and at the same time to give the current government's 
6. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 
(1983). 
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party line that "abortion {is not] an appropriate method of family 
planning. " Maybe it makes sense that the taxpayers should not have 
to share your expenses for going to Congress to lobby for your private 
interest, but that doesn't mean that it would be all right to pay you 
not to lobby. Also, from what you told me, this program of funding 
family-planning clinics did not start with these conditions, and has 
been going on quite a while without them. Only now these conditions 
are added, which to me really makes the situation one where continu-
ing funding depends on silence, and where money or the threat of its 
withdrawal is being held out as both the carrot and stick to insure 
that silence. 
Are those frozen pizzas you have in your cart any good? 
Look, up to now all we've been talking about is the doctor's free 
speech rights. But I hope you would agree that the woman also has 
speech rights that are implicated. And from what I've been hearing 
from you, when it comes down to it, your position is that the only way 
that a woman can get this family-planning service is to give up her 
right to speak freely about abortion with her doctor. 
You're talking as if these family-planning clinics were some-
how a personal, government-bestowed benefit to the women who go 
to the clinic, and that the government has attached a condition I 
assume you find unconstitutional on that benefit. 1 But, we're not 
dealing with any benefit, we're talking about the government fund-
ing a project like a symphony, or a dam, or health research. Of 
course, those projects "benefit" us, but no one would consider them 
personal benefits like Social Security, unemployment, or welfare. 
If the government gave vouchers that were good for consultations 
at family-planning clinics, are you saying that it could condition use 
of those vouchers on the patient agreeing not to discuss abortion with 
her doctor? 
I have no doubt that the government could limit the use of the 
vouchers so that they could not be used for abortion-related serv-
ices, including counseling. 
I can understand how the government might refuse to reimburse 
the clinic for the amount of time spent on abortion counseling serv-
ices. But are you saying that the patient couldn't even discuss abor-
tion with the doctor without losing the benefit of the voucher? 
Well ... discussion is different from a formal program of coun-
seling. Anyway, there are no vouchers. These are dollars given 
straight to the clinic program by the federal government. 
I don't see why that matters. What difference does it make 
7. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
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whether the government chooses to fund family planning by giving 
the money directly to the clinic in the first place, or to the clinic after 
the clinic redeems vouchers from individual patients? The individual 
patient gets the same benefit under the present method as if she were 
given vouchers. This is not like a "benefit" to the whole community 
like you were mentioning-you know, roads, museums, buildings. 
This is clearly individual, a woman~ one-to-one relationship with her 
doctor. In fact, the individual nature of the relationship is what a 
doctor-patient relationship is all about. 
I see your point, but I don't agree. Is that sugar-free hot choc-
olate you've bought any good? 
There is one thing you said that I'd like to go back to, Mr. 
Mitchell. You said voting was a fundamental right. Is the nght of a 
woman to choose to have an abortion a real constitutional right, too? 
Or, are some constitutional rights more important than others? 
Well, the Court has at times considered whether there is a hier-
archy of constitutional rights, like during the so-called "incorpora-
tion" debate,s and recently when it limited access on habeas corpus 
for fourth amendment violations.9 But, is that what you're asking 
me? 
I don't know. What I was asking was whether, at least as of 
today, a woman's right to choose to have an abortion was a real con-
stitutional right. 
Sure. It's a real constitutional right. 
Well, what does it mean to say that women have the constitu-
tional right to choose when at the same time women are denied the 
information they need to make that choice because, by conscious gov-
ernmental design, the clinics are forbidden to give that information? 
I personally find this remarkable, when our whole "information soci-
ety" is based on the premise that knowledge is power. 
Initially, I wouldn't characterize all this as the clinics being 
"forbidden" to give certain information. They just must tell the pa-
tient that they don't give that information because that is not a ser-
vice they provide. Further, I think we must be clear about what is 
really involved here. Realistically, the government's concern is not 
just about giving some information. These regulations are really 
meant to keep the clinics from advising, encouraging, etc. 
I don't know how you can say that when the clinics aren't even 
allowed to give the name of someone who will perform an abortion to 
a patient who specifically requests the information. 
8. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
9. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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I think we're getting off the main point. Don't you think that 
women in America already know about their right to have an 
abortion? 
Maybe they do. I really don't know. I would think that most of 
us, through TV or otherwise, know about the Miranda warnings, but 
the police still have to give them. This is like instructing the police 
that they can't tell a suspect his or her rights, even if the officer 
wishes. I just think that for the government to affirmatively seek to 
deny information to the woman inteiferes with the very choice that is 
at the heart of what you agreed was a real constitutional right 
What if I told you that the Court has already held that neither 
states nor the federal government must provide free abortions to 
indigent women and that it is legal to refuse the use of a state facil-
ity for abortions?w Now surely in those cases the government has 
affected the woman's choice, and I think you would agree, to a far 
greater degree than here; yet, the Court found the state's and/or the 
federal government's actions legal. So you might want to give up on 
that point. 
You mean that their past mistakes justify their present ones? 
Madam, that's precedent, stare decisis-the backbone of our 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Well anyway, I don't know what I think about those cases you 
just mentioned. My first impression is that they don't quite sound 
right. But even if they somehow make sense, they're different from 
this situation. Denying a free abortion to a poor woman or access to 
state hospitals for the procedure certainly makes the woman's choice 
harder and will no doubt strongly influence, and in some cases deter-
mine, that choice. But here, by deliberately denying proper informa-
tion, the government is interfering with the very process of choosing. 
It is one thing to add weight on one side of the scale, and quite an-
other to tamper with the scale itself. By tampering here with the pro-
cess of choosing, the government deliberately inteiferes with the very 
core of that right. Anyway, aren't people supposed to be informed of 
their rights? 
You're thinking of a very different situation, generally in the 
criminal context. The concern about informing a defendant of his 
rights takes place where the defendant is about to intentionally give 
up constitutional rights (like when pleading guilty), or at least is at 
risk of doing so (like during police questioning). Here, you surely 
cannot contend that the woman will somehow give up or waive her 
right to an abortion during her visit at the family-planning clinic. 
10. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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In fact, with the exception of the inherently coercive realm of police 
questioning, informing a defendant of his rights as a predicate to 
finding a "voluntary" waiver is limited to the formal court process. 
Thus, the Court does not require that the defendant be told of his 
rights prior to waiver of, for example, his fourth amendment rights 
when agreeing to consent to a search of his car or such. II In these 
situations, all the Court cares about is that the defendant's waiver 
was voluntary in the sense that, under the "totality of the circum-
stances," he was not coerced into giving up his rights. Surely even 
you cannot transform the family-planning clinic into an engine of 
coercion. 
But why are you so confident that this is not coercion? 
Excuse me, but I must be missing something. No one in the 
clinic is asking the woman to give up her right to abortion. No one 
is even supposed to discuss abortion-that's what I thought we 
have been debating about. After leaving the clinic, the woman can 
go somewhere for an abortion. She hasn't given up anything, so 
how has she been coerced? What right has she waived? 
I don't agree. I think that as a practical matter the restrictions 
will cause many women to effectively give up their right to an abor-
tion at the family-planning clinic. Here the government has con-
sciously structured the flow of information-what can and what 
can't be said-so that it invariably pushes a woman towards 
childbearing, and in effect has disguised this propaganda machine to 
look like a normal medical clinic, where the doctors are just there to 
help you. It's a bit like having an FBI agent in a confessional, pre-
tending to be a priest. This is particularly significant when you recog-
nize the unique relationship of the reality of "timing" to this 
particular right. When a woman comes into the clinic pregnant-
which is really the situation all these new regulations had in mind-
and she is channeled to prenatal care, the clock keeps ticking. The 
limited window of time in which the woman can get a safe or legal 
abortion na"ows and, in this passage of time, the woman's ability to 
exercise her right literally disappears. Not even the Supreme Court 
can restore this right once nature's clock has moved on. So the clinic 
does not have to ask the woman to give up her right to an abortion. It 
only needs to delay that decision, and nature and the legal time-
frame for an abortion will take its course. 
Wait a minute. These are just birth control clinics. Most of 
their time is spent advising on various matters of contraception and 
such, not with anti-abortion propaganda. Again, they are not even 
11. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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to discuss abortion. They do not and are not meant to deal with 
pre-natal care-of any kind, abortion or childbirth. 
Come on. When they must say that abortion is not appropriate 
family planning? I repeat, this is a disguised government propaganda 
machine. 
We've been through this before. Telling the patient that the 
project does not consider abortion appropriate family planning is a 
permissive, not a mandatory response. They can say it, they don't 
have to. They can just say that the project cannot make such refer-
rals. But, we're getting off track again. Let me address your point 
about whether women must be told of their right to an abortion. 
Even if I were to accept your fanciful proposition that this federally-
funded clinic somehow replicates the coercive atmosphere of police 
interrogation or a formal court hearing, you're still not talking 
about informing women about their rights, you're talking about giv-
ing them advice and counseling. Even under Miranda and the 
guilty plea cases, the defendant must only "know" his rights; i.e., be 
informed of such rights, not have the government advise and coun-
sel him. 
But don't they have to tell a defendant about the consequences 
of his decision-that what he says can and will be used against him 
in court, that if he pleads he could face such and such a sentence? 
Also, we do provide someone to advise and counsel the defendant who 
is not bound to take the government's line--an attorney. 
Very good. But this still looks more like a medical clinic than 
the rear of a police car to me. 
If you don't see how really coercive this is, it's because you aren't 
even considering that we're talking about all the information here 
coming from doctors. See, what really bothers me about all this, Mr. 
Mitchell, is that these regulations result in using doctors in such a 
way that both misleads their patients and, in the process, genuinely 
weakens the woman's constitutional right to choose to have an 
abortion. 
How? This not an "all encompassing" medical service; this is 
just a family-planning clinic. Patients know this and do not reason-
ably expect that they will receive the type of comprehensive medical 
advice that they would get at a general medical clinic or hospital. 
So, how are they misled? Certainly not by the doctors as you sug-
gest. No doctor is forced to say anything he or she does not person-
ally or professionally believe. Quite the contrary, they are required 
to clarify any misunderstanding by informing the patient that abor-
tion advice is beyond the scope of the program. Getting to the bot-
tom line, the woman is no worse off regarding her right to choose an 
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abortion than if there were no federal funds and no federally sup-
ported clinics. 
I don't even know where to begin-you're so wrong. 
I'm all ears. 
Fine, here goes. First, let's talk about the scope of care the wo-
man is entitled to expect. If I go to an orthopedist, it is true that I 
don't expect advice on the measles, but I do expect consultation on 
every aspect and alternative related to my sprained ankle. I'd be out-
raged if the doctor did not even mention use of a pressure cast be-
cause he or she had some philosophical objection to its use. The same 
principle applies here. Women might not have reason to expect what 
you call "comprehensive" advice on, for example, urinary tract infec-
tions, but they sure are entitled to expect such advice when it concerns 
the very subject for which they are visiting the clinic-childbirth. 
Second, I don't understand how you can say that the regulations 
don't make the doctors say anything they don't believe and don't tend 
to make the doctors mislead their patients. Even if, as you say, the 
doctors don't have to mouth that phrase about abortion not being an 
appropriate method-although it does seem to be strongly en-
couraged-what's most important is that there is much that the doc-
tors aren't allowed to say. We all know that our communication is 
composed of both what we say and what we don't say, and that what 
we don't say is often the most important. You're just wrong to think 
that words cannot be put into someone's mouth by taking other words 
out. As to being misleading, kids are experts at misleading their par-
ents through omission. So don't tell us that omitting information 
about abortion won't mislead patients as to what they think their doc-
tors believe. Third, if you stop playing lawyer and try to think in 
terms of day-to-day, human reality, then there's no way a woman 
isn't worse off in terms of exercising her constitutional rights to an 
abortion than if there were no federal money, no clinics, and no doc-
tors. So, let's get real. Remember, women are seeing the doctors 
about the topic of potential childbirth. When the doctors then only 
focus on certain family-planning options and give them the company 
line about abortion not being "appropriate," in a real sense, a wo-
man's capacity to now choose abortion is diminished, mostly because 
it is a doctor giving her this information. For most of us, a doctor is 
not an ordinary conveyor of information and provider of services. In 
our society, he or she assumes an almost unique position of authority 
and status, all bound together by a relationship of total trust. There's 
even a privilege for doctors and their patients, isn't there? Doctors 
play the role of both moral and medical advisors in our society, and 
this is reinforced through literature, media, and shared cultural ex-
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perience. No, the woman is not now in the same position as if there 
were no clinic or doctor, because all the imagery and reality of who a 
doctor is has been used by the government to reinforce the dogma of a 
particular administration and the doctor, wittingly or otherwise, has 
acted as an agent of these government values. This is not like simply 
handing out pamphlets about birth control options that fail to men-
tion abortion. This is using federal subsidies to make people in posi-
tions of trust abuse that trust. Why not tell parents that they cannot 
take their children as tax exemptions unless they agree to sign a pa-
per that, whenever the topic of abortion is raised, they use their paren-
tal powers to make it plain that they do not consider it .. appropriate"? 
After all, why should the government be forced to subsidize parenting 
that does not inspire the kind of values the government desires? Or 
imagine that the government pays for a program of career counseling 
in the schools which is specifically intended to open students to the 
possibility of careers in .. public service. " Admirable. It's just that the 
government interprets .. public service" as not including groups who 
oppose the government-environmental groups, advocates for the 
homeless, even public defende~nd all counselors are instructed 
not to mention these groups and to tell students that these groups do 
not represent .. appropriate" careers. Do you really doubt that this 
program will completely manipulate the ability of at least some stu-
dents to choose a career? And these counselors will have nothing like 
the almost mystical position of doctors. Most importantly, though it 
is true that the schools did not have to take money for the program, 
that is no answer in our real world. It is the students who would 
suffer from a deliberately deceptive system intended to distort their 
ability to make meaningful choices. I think you get my point. 
I'm sure I do. Well, do you think the doctors in the family-
planning clinics should give their patients some kind of disclaimer 
as to the scope of their services? 
I sure dol And the patient should have to read it first thing. 
Now, don't get me wrong. I don't think these disclaimers fix the real 
problem that the woman is being denied advice she needs and has the 
right to expect. I just think that given the worst of all worlds, the 
disclaimer would be better than nothing. 
Good. Why don't you draft one someday. Is that microwave 
caramel corn any good? 
Why don't I draft it right now? [3 minutes later, the task was 
completed on the back of her grocery list . . . ] 
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NOTICE TO PATIENTS 
I am a doctor, but I am only allowed to discuss pre-pregnancy 
birth control with you. 
I am not allowed to discuss abortion with you or counsel you 
about abortion. 
If you ask me about abortion, I am not allowed to give my 
personal or professional opinion. 
If you ask for a referral for an abortion, I am required to repeat 
something like, "This project does not consider abortion an ap-
propriate method of family planning." 
Again, this does not necessarily reflect my personal or profes-
sional opinion. 
If you want the name of a facility where you can get counseling 
to help you decide whether or not to have an abortion, I can 
give you a list of such places. 
What do you think, Mr. Mitchell? 
Interesting. But that last one looks like a direct violation of the 
law. 
As I understand it, the regulations say that you can't refer a 
woman for an abortion-right? 
Right. 
Counseling about abortion isn't the same as an abortion, is it? 
Well, no. 
I mean, after counseling you could very well decide not to have 
an abortion, right? 
Right. But there's a little problem. Part of the regulations for-
bid the clinic from engaging in activities that "encourage, promote, 
or advocate abortion as a method of family planning."12 
Let me think. As I understand what you've said, this list of 
forbidden activities under the regulation include things like lobbying 
for abortion, creating pro-abortion materials, giving money to abor-
tion advocacy groups, and stuff like that. 13 In other words, real pro-
abortion activity. Sending someone to a counselor who, in fact, may 
make the woman realize that abortion is not the right solution for 
her, isn't pro-anything. It's like those voters' pamphlets that explain 
the pros and cons of ballot issues so you can make a good choice on 
how to vote. The pamphlets don't tell you how to choose, and neither 
does referral to counseling. Unless the regulation means not only 
that you cannot encourage abortion, but that you must affirmatively 
take steps to discourage abortion--and I don't think either the regu-
12. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1765. 
13. ld. 
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lotion or list of forbidden activities read that way-then, technically, 
giving the list of counselors is not forbidden. 
I don't think it's so simple. The regulations also specifically 
provide that the clinic must refer every pregnant woman "for ap-
propriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of 
available providers that promote the welfare of the mother and un-
born child."I4 This list, in tum, may not be weighted or otherwise 
used to encourage abortion. So unless you're arguing that abortion 
promotes the "welfare" of the unborn child because the child would 
have been better off not born-a position on which I sincerely doubt 
those drafting the regulations would concur-then you can't give 
women your list of abortion counselors. 
The regulations are clear that pregnant women must be referred 
to providers on this list? 
Absolutely. 
But, do the regulations say that when you make this mandatory 
referral, you are forbidden to refer for anything else, except abortion? 
Well, no; but the clear spirit . . . 
I mean, you could also refer them to an eye specialist or skin 
doctor. 
Sure. 
Then, technically, I'm not forbidden to refer them to a coun-
selor, and technical is good enough for me. 
I can't believe it; they're closing this line! Wait. Checkstand 
#6 just opened. Every person for themselves/ Give my love to the 
family, Mr. Mitchell! 
And so it ended. I left with but one thought. Justices Rehn-
quist, Kennedy, White, Scalia and Souter, if you're going to discuss 
this case, confine yourself to eminent legal scholars and jurists, 
practicing attorneys, and law students. Some will agree with you, 
some will disagree; but you will be able to hold your own. But 
never, ever try to discuss Rust v. Sullivan with a lady in a grocery 
line. Trust me, you won't get the best of it. 
14. ld. 
